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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses pricing and mass customization in the last mile of 
the postal value chain. It does so by analyzing a delivery model based on the 
receiver pays principle. It is calibrated by means of market research data. We 
look at a case study, and discuss our conclusions. 
Indeed, given the high cost-relevance of the last mile, and against the 
background of decreasing economies of  density
2 from declining volumes, 
universal service providers are increasingly focusing on ways to reduce costs 
at the distribution end of the value chain. The se include  delivering more 
efficiently or reducing service levels. In contrast to theses approaches, 
Felisberto et al. (2006) present a delivery model which gives  more value to 
the last mile by introducing a delivery fee payable by recipients in order to 
receive  services  above  a  minimum  standard  level.  While  this  minimum 
standard level is likely to be below current USO-levels, fee-driven services 
or service bundles will open the door for tailor-made delivery according to 
the needs of individual recipients. This Receiver Pays Principle (RPP) aims 
to reduce the proportion of  overserved receivers in order to align  supply 
(delivered  value)  and  demand  (expected  value),  allowing  both  potential 
savings as well as a level playing field for new price-service bundles created 
according to the segmented receiver base. 
                                                 
1  The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the opinion of the institutions they are affiliated with. 
2  For a detailed discussion on economies of scale, density and scope in Switzerland 





Pricing the last mile equals a two-part tariff scheme where both sender 
and recipients bear the cost of sending a piece of mail: the former paying the 
postage and the latter a delivery fee. As shown in Felisberto et al. (2006), a 
two-part tariff, for example including a variable postage and a fixed delivery 
fee, would allow postal rates to come closer to marginal costs and thus to 
economically more efficient pricing. It can also be shown that this model 
provides an option for financing the universal service obligation – or, more 
precisely, the universal delivery obligation of postal operators – and that it 
increases overall welfare.
3 
There are a number of political and market developments that point to the 
same direction. Given the ongoing policy shift towards liberalization, the 
current levels of the universal service obligation are increasingly questioned. 
At  the  same  time,  the  trend  towards  “convenience”,  and  technological 
advances  supporting  this trend, lead to increased  demand  for  customized 
delivery services. This opens the way for innovations at the delivery end of 
the postal value chain.
4 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the willingness of 
households to pay for home delivery of mail. It also shows how a discrete 
choice analysis yields different results on the consumers‟ willingness to pay 
for last mile delivery than a linear regression based on direct questioning. 
Section 3 reassesses the welfare implications of last mile pricing. We find 
that demand effects have to be well understood before introducing a delivery 
flat rate in the postal market. Section 4 presents field results from Denmark. 
These highlight the cost sensitivity of recipients. We conclude in Section 5.   
 
 
2.  WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR LAST MILE DELIVERY 
 
In  2005,  a  representative  survey  was  conducted  among  private 
households in order to elicit the willingness to pay for mail home delivery in 
                                                 
3  Kim and Lim (2000), Jeon, Laffont and Tirole (2004) and Hermalin and Katz 
(2004), among others, discuss under which exact assumptions, RPP increases both 
welfare and profits. 
4  The introduction of the RPP is not actually a real innovation: In the pre-Rowland 
Hill era, the RPP was a common means of payment for mail services. Cf. e.g. 




5 Two different survey methods were applied: A factorial survey 
and a direct questioning. 
 
Factorial Survey – Discrete Choice Analysis  
In  a  factorial  survey  a  representative  sample  of  decision  makers  is 
presented a (discrete) choice in a hypothetical situation whether or not to 
accept  a  certain  offer,  which  is  characterized  in  several  dimensions,  e.g. 
price  and  quality. Thereby,  the  individuals are  presented  different choice 
situations (“vignettes”) to get a comprehensive picture on the preferences 
over the analyzed product dimensions. Such a factorial survey is therefore an 
experimental design. It can be developed in three steps: (1) identifying the 
variables, (2) writing a coherent vignette, and (3) randomly generating the 
vignettes. To get more insights on the receiver‟s willingness to pay for mail 
delivery to the doorstep, we chose the product dimensions as shown in Table 
1. 
 
Table 1: Hypothetical product characteristics 
Dimensions  Values 
Price for home delivery  CHF 10, 20, 30 per month 
Product
6  Food, Beverages, Mail 
Time of P.O. box delivery  6am, 10am 
Time needed for pickup by the customer  5, 15, 30 Minutes per pickup 
Household characteristic  Single household, Family with two kids 
 
A  total  of  460  interviews  with  4640  vignettes  were  conducted  by  the 
Kalaidos Fachhochschule in Switzerland. Due to inconsistent responses, 210 
vignettes were cancelled from the data, such that 4430 vignettes were finally 
included in the analysis. Thereof, 1411 concerned vignettes on mail delivery.  
The economic model behind the factorial survey can be summarized as 
follows.
7 Indirect utilities from choosing home delivery or post office box 
delivery is assumed to be 
 
j j i ij j ij w z U         ' '  
 
with  subscript  i  denoting  individuals  and  subscript  j{h,p}  being  the 
chosen mode of mail delivery (h standing for home delivery and p standing 
for post office box delivery). j is a mode-dependent constant, zij are mode 
                                                 
5  An early reference on the households‟ willingness to pay for doorstep delivery is 
Elsenbast (1996). 
6  In order to camouflage the purpose of the survey, other products than mail 
delivery were also included in the vignettes. 
7  This is the random utility interpretation to the households‟ discrete choice model 
(cf. e.g. Greene, ,2000, Chapter 19). Consumer preferences and last mile pricing  page 4 
 
 
characteristics, such as price of a P.O. box, the time to reach it, and the 
delivery  time.  wi  is  the  household  characteristic, and  j  is  an  error  term. 
Hence, indirect utility in either delivery mode depends on the household 
characteristic and the characteristics of the mode itself. The probability P 
that  doorstep  delivery  is  chosen  is  equal  to  the  probability  that  the 
corresponding indirect utility is higher than under post office box delivery: 
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where F is chosen to be the logistic distribution, 
 







 F . 
 
Due to the logistic functional form of F, the parameters and  can be 
estimated directly via logistic regression. The results are shown in Table 2.
8 
 
Table 2: Logistic regression results 
  Coefficient  Std. Dev.  Wald
9  Significance 
Price  -0.088  0.009  107.299  0.000 
Pickup time  0.016  0.006  6.656  0.010 
Delivery time  0.179  0.129  1.938  0.164 
Household
10  0.094  0.127  0.547  0.460 
Constant  0.201  0.216  0.872  0.350 
 
These results can be explained as follows: The price and the pickup time 
influence the decision for home mail delivery on a 1% level of significance 
(p-value equal or below 1%). Delivery time and household characteristic do 
not significantly influence the decision.  
The sign of the coefficient gives the direction of the effect of a change in 
the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing home delivery. The 
negative  estimated  coefficient  on  price  suggests that  an  increase  in  price 
gives a lower probability of choosing home delivery. Suppose the original 
                                                 
8  Cox & Snell R2=0.089, Nagelkerkes R2=0.129 which measure the goodness of fit 
for binary choice models (Cf. Backhaus et al., 2003). 
9  Cf. Greene (2000), p. 825. 
10 Household is a dummy variable controlling for household size: 0 if family 
household, 1 for single household. Consumer preferences and last mile pricing  page 5 
 
 
probability of choosing home delivery was 15%. Then, an increase of CHF 1 
per month decreases the probability by 0.04 percentage points, controlling 
for other variables in the model.
11 
As indicated, for the logit model, the estimated coefficients do not have a 
direct economic interpretation, since the estimated logit coefficients by 
themselves  without assuming an  original probability of choosing home 
delivery  do not yield changes in the probabilities associated with a unit 
change in each explanatory variable. Marginal changes in the probabilities 
could be calculated by rescaling the estimated logit coefficients, bu t this 
value changes at each probability level and hence has to be evaluated at 
different probability levels.  Therefore, it is useful to consider the same 
question by directly eliciting the individual willingness to pay . This can be 
analyzed meaningfully by an OLS regression where the coefficients lend 
themselves to an interpretation of marginal effects on the dependent variable. 
The results of the logistic regression are displayed graphically in the next 
section in comparison with the revealed willingness to pay as obtained from 
direct questioning. 
 
Direct Questioning – Linear Regression 
In  the  direct  questioning  part  of  the  survey,  individuals  were  asked 
directly how much they would be willing to pay for mail home delivery, a 
free post office box service being the alternative. Thus, they are no longer 
asked to make a discrete choice over a range of hypothetical products but 
rather they can express their valuation for the product „home delivery of 
mail‟  in  currency.  This  enables  us  to  apply  ordinary  OLS  regression 
techniques. 
The model used here treats the willingness to pay  as a function of age, 
gross monthly income, gender, number of children in the household, number 
of adults in the household, nationality, household location (urban, rural), all 
contained in x: 
 
     ' x , 
 
                                                 
11 The computation is as follows: An initial probability of 15% corresponds to odds 
of 15/85 = 0.176.The logistic coefficient is -0.088. This corresponds to an odds 
ratio of exp(-0.088) = 0.92. Thus the odds of 0.176 multiplied by the odds ratio of 
0.92 = new odds of the dependent of 0.176. Let x be the new probability. We 
know x/(1-x) = 0.176 since the odds are defined as the probability divided by the 
not-probability (which is thus 1-x). Solving for x, we get x = 0.1496. Thus, for an 
original probability of 15%, a logistic coefficient of -0.088 means that a unit 
increase in the price decreases the probability to 14.96%. Consumer preferences and last mile pricing  page 6 
 
 




Table 3: Results of linear regression 
  Coefficient  Std. Dev.  t  Significance 
Age  0.079  0.087  0.910  0.365 
Gross income  0.000  0.000  2.081  0.040 
Gender  3.303  2.170  1.523  0.131 
Children  -2.077  1.153  -1.801  0.074 
Adults  -0.277  1.641  -0.169  0.866 
Nationality  -4.754  3.150  -1.509  0.134 
Urban Citizen  1.072  2.600  0.412  0.681 
Rural Citizen  1.318  2.730  0.483  0.630 
Constant   10.628  5.566  1.910  0.059 
 
Only household income  (at the 5% level)  and the number of children 
living in a household (at the 10% level) have a significant influence on the 
willingness to pay for home mail delivery. The amount people are willing to 
disburse increases in the gross household income and decreases with the 
number  of  children.  Interestingly,  the  willingness  to  pay  seems  to  be 
independent of whether a person is living in rural or city regions. 
 
When asked directly, only 36% of all households seem to have a positive 
willingness to pay for doorstep delivery ( > 0). Out of these households, 
58% prefer daily delivery, 21% are content with weekly delivery, while the 
others wish a delivery every other day (12%) or twice per week (9%). 
64% of all households say they have zero willingness to pay for doorstep 
delivery, thus preferring P.O. box delivery anyways (  0). Those choosing 
post office box delivery of mail seem to be motivated partly by the lack of 
need for frequent mail reception: Only 46% of households would pick up 
mail  daily,  as  compared  to  58%  who  prefer  daily  home  delivery.  More 
importantly,  35%  percent  of  P.O.  box  holders  state  that  they  would  not 
empty their P.O. box anymore – their value of mail seems to be lower than 
the opportunity cost of emptying the P.O. box.
13 
Finally, based on the direct questioning we know how many percent of 
the population would choose home delivery over post office box delivery at 
a certain price: at a price of CHF 1 per month, 36% would choose home 
delivery (this corresponds to the number  of households mentioned above 
with a positive willingness to pay). 28% would do so at a price of CHF 10 
                                                 
12 R2=0.110, adjusted R2=0.043. 
13 We think that this figure needs to be taken with caution. Evidence from an 
existing P.O. Box delivery scheme suggests that only a very small fraction of 
people would, in fact, not empty their P.O. Boxes at all. Consumer preferences and last mile pricing  page 7 
 
 
per month. Then the willingness to pay drops: at a price of CHF 20 only 9% 
would choose home delivery, and 3% at a price of CHF 30.  
 
Comparison: discrete choice analysis – linear regression   
Based  on  the  two  surveys  (factorial  survey,  direct  questioning),  a 
comparison between the results of the two designs is possible (see Figure 1). 
It is interesting to note that the revealed willingness to pay is significantly 
higher  when  elicited  by  a  factorial  survey  (dark  shaded  bars)  than  when 
obtained  by  direct  questioning  (light  shaded  bars):  For  instance,  when 
directly asked, only 9% of households would pay CHF 20 or more for mail 
home  delivery,  compared  to  25%  when  asked  indirectly  in  the  factorial 
survey. 
 




































































Hence, one has to be careful when basing actual pricing decisions on 
survey  data  since  households  are  extremely  reluctant  to  reveal  their  true 
willingness to pay for goods and services. The willingness to pay revealed 
by the factorial survey is superior, as strategic answers can be excluded. We 
base  our  further  analysis  on  this  first  approach  and  conclude  that  the 
receiver‟s willingness to pay depends primarily on the three factors price of 
home delivery, time to reach the pick-up point, and household income.    
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3.  RECALIBRATED WELFARE ANALYSIS 
Based on these results we are now able to recalibrate the model as set out 
in Felisberto et al. (2006). For a complete description of the model including 
data sources, we refer to this paper. For the moment, the main difference 
concerns the calibration of the demand function for home delivery. We will 
briefly recalibrate the model according to the willingness to pay as set out in 
Section 2, calculate the optimal delivery charge and restate the estimated 
effects on total welfare.  
In the original model, demand for doorstep delivery was determined by 
the receivers‟ opportunity cost OC of collecting the mail at the P.O. box 
location:  
 
  s t w t w OC   
  ) , ( . 
 
I.e.  the  opportunity  cost  was  assumed  to  be  a  function  of  the  two 
observed variables household income w and pick-up time t (the time needed 
to  empty  the  P.O.  box)  which  we  let  unchanged.  Using  the  revealed 
preferences  as  presented  in  Section  2,  we  can  now  calibrate  the  three 
remaining parameters α, β and s. The variables α and β express the way 
customers value the opportunity money and time, and s can be interpreted as 
the search costs needed to realize the opportunity income. Table 4 presents 
the new calibration.  
 
Table 4: Recalibrated parameters 
Parameter  Value 
s [CHF]  300 
α  1.15 
β  0.75 
 
These new values yield a demand curve that corresponds to the revealed 
preferences as shown in Figure 1. We note that the new curve is surprisingly 
close to the original one. The main difference is the larger fraction of the 
population willing to pay relatively high delivery flat rates. 
Figure 2 presents the new results of Scenario 1, where we assume that 
every P.O. box holder collects its mail. This assumption enables us to ensure 
that the change from doorstep delivery to P.O. box delivery does not effect 
mail demand. I.e. the sender‟s utility of mail is not affected, because it still 
knows that the mail is finally received and accepted by the recipient. We 
further assume that the average yearly fixed costs of providing a P.O. Box is 
CHF 60.  Consumer preferences and last mile pricing  page 9 
 
 
The graph shows that the welfare optimizing delivery rate would be about 
CHF 636 where only 2% of the individuals would pay the fee for doorstep 
delivery. In other words, it would be optimal to abolish home delivery to a 
large extent. The local maximum is located at a flat rate of CHF 156 where 
over 40% of the households would keep household delivery. 
 









































We now relax the assumption, that all the new P.O. box holders will 
empty their mail and assume according to the data presented in Section 2, 
that 35% of the P.O. box holders will not anymore collect their mail. This 
has now an effect on the senders‟ utilities, as all the mail destined to 35% of 
P.O. box recipients is returned to the sender. Hence, the sender only incurs a 
cost, but no utility for these letters; the sender will think twice to send again 
letters to these 35% P.O. box addresses. 
We  consider  this  effect  in  our  second  scenario  by  assuming  that  the 
senders stop mailing to P.O. box that are not emptied. By assuming, that the 
recipients‟ volumes are identically distributed among the willingness to pay 
for doorstep delivery, demand drops exactly by 0.35 times the fraction of 
P.O. box users.  
The effects on welfare and profit are dramatic as shown in Figure 3. The 
reduction in mail demand is not offset by the cost reduction that occurs from 
the change from doorstep to P.O. box delivery. This yields a decline in  both 
welfare  and  profit.  We  conclude  that  demand  effects  need  to  be  well 
understood before introducing a receiver pays principle in the postal market.  
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The two presented scenarios represent the boundaries of the effects of a 
delivery flat rate. No better welfare results as shown in Scenario 1 can be 
expected as long as the willingness to pay for doorstep delivery is not lower 
than  revealed from  our  representative  sample  in  Section  2.  On  the  other 
hand, Scenario 2 will be the lower bound of the effects of RPP, as the ones 
who  do  not  collect  their  mail  anymore  are  most  probably  the  ones  that 
receive fewer letters per year (our assumption of uniform distribution among 
willingness to pay is too pessimistic). Further to that, we question whether 
the respondents indicating a zero willingness to pay carefully considered the 
consequences of not being connected to the postal network.  
We so far conclude from our analysis, that it is a crucial point for the 
whole mailing industry whether recipients are willing to empty their mailbox 
or not. If the perceived value of the mail is low, it can not be ruled out that 
these individuals will not collect their mail anymore if in the same time the 
cost associated to empty the mail or P.O. box is too high (unless they are 
forced by law to do so). 
If we think the story further on, one could even argue that some receivers 
should not pay, but receive money to collect their mail. Why should senders 
not  start  to  compensate  those  receivers  with  (1)  either  low  net  utility  of 
receiving mail or (2) with high bargaining power towards the sender? We 
will  not  develop this  point  further  and  leave  the computation  within  our 
model for future research. 
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4.  FIRST EXPERIENCES WITH LAST MILE PRICING IN 
DENMARK 
We  now  present  a  case  study  on  the  Receiver  Pays  Principle  from 
Denmark. One of the strategic goals for Post Danmark on it´s way towards 
2006 has been to enlarge the customer perspective, so the receivers needs 
also is considered as a possible business case. This new market approach is 
considered  to  fit  well  with  the  overall  trends  in  the  society,  where  the 
consumers  increasingly  demands  long  opening  hours  and  tailor  made 
solutions to a more and more individual way of living. Until now, the focus 
has been primarily on the senders. This new approach with focus on the 
receivers needs has challenged the Danish Post to develop services targeted 
the receiver.  
The first target has been to enable the receiver to decide when he or she 
wants to receive the mail, as this kind of services seems to meet the trend in 
the private households, where more and more people are working at home, 
and the needs within the business to react quickly.      
This means that standard delivery terms are defined by the sender, and if 
the  receiver  wants  another  service  level,  he  has  the  possibility  to  chose 
among  two  alternatives.  The  first  step  in  Denmark  was  to  check  if  the 
receiver was willing to pay for eighter for an early home delivery before 
10am or a P.O. box where the mail can be pick up before 9am. 
Based on some of the theoretical considerations as mentioned earlier, and 
against the background of a market study, Post Danmark decided to test the 
concept of a delivery flat rate in the market. The market study indicated that 
a  significant  number  of  households  value  early  delivery;  however,  it 
remained not clear, how far the fact that delivery had been considered a free 
service in the past would influence the willingness to pay for a value-adding, 
fee-based early delivery. 
The concept chosen for the market test represents a simple but typical 
example  of  the  receiver  pays  principle.  The  product  profile  guarantees 
delivery  before  10am.  Post  Danmark  has  –  inspired  by  publishers  of 
newspapers and magazines – decided to offer customers a subscription to 
these services. This decision was made with a view to offering customers 
simple  product  solutions  and  minimizing  the  company‟s  administrative 
costs.  
The individual customer is bound by half-yearly subscriptions. Today, it 
is  possible  to  buy  a  subscription  for  letters,  and  the  option  will  later  be 
extended to include parcels as well as a combination of letters and parcels. 
Post Danmark guarantees delivery of the items before 10am six days a week. 
If delivery is not made as guaranteed, the customer can claim reimbursement 
of the amount paid for guarantee of delivery on the day in question. As a 
basic rule, Post Danmark will trust the customer and pay back the amount. If Consumer preferences and last mile pricing  page 12 
 
 
the  same  customer  repeatedly  complains  about  non-performance  of  the 
guarantee of delivery, it is possible for Post Danmark to check the quality of 
delivery to the customer, as the mail carrier will each day scan a barcode at 
the site of delivery as documentation.  
Delivery before 10am is a product, which all urban zone customers, i.e. 
business as well as private recipients, can buy. 85% of all households in 
Denmark  are  urban  zone  households.  Therefore,  the  service  has  a  great 
potential in relation to all households.  
The product was marketed as of the beginning of February, 2006. This 
means that a time span of four months can be evaluated. For a product which 
potentially  alters  a  long-established  paradigm  in  the  postal  industry  (free 
delivery) and which may need some time to penetrate the market this is not a 
long time. However, we may draw some first conclusions. 
So  far,  the  results  have  been  modest.  Approximately  2,000  customers 
have bought a subscription for delivery before 10am. There are a number of 
different reasons for the modest results. 
Firstly, a number of business customers having earlier received their mail 
before 10am are resistant to having to pay for the service in future. These 
customers perceive early delivery of mail to be a service included in the 
postage charged for delivery. The resistance has proved to be exactly as 
pronounced  as  reflected  in  the  market  analyses.  The  reactions  from  a 
significant  number  of  receiving  customers  indicate  that  these  customers 
place greater demands on the service, which they also believe is a service for 
which payment is to take place by means of the postage charged from the 
sender. 
Some  of  these  customers  understand  that  Post  Danmark  cannot  offer 
everyone a supplementary service at no charge. However, they believe that 
Post  Danmark  might  have  started  by  offering  new  customers  to  buy  a 
subscription for the service.  
Secondly, Post Danmark has opted for a soft introduction. Accordingly, 
routes have not been reorganized in connection with the implementation of 
recipient-paid  services,  which  means  that  approximately  80,000  business 
customers will continue to receive their mail before 10am. A number of 
these customers have chosen to wait and see and consider the situation on 
the implementation of the reorganized routes. In connection with the launch 
of recipient-paid services, Post Danmark also recommended the customers to 
wait and consider the situation on the implementation of the  reorganized 
routes, thereby explicitly allowing free-riding and accepting the associated 
negative demand effects for the 10am guarantee. 
Thirdly,  the  frequent  practice  of  co-distribution  of  letters  and  parcels 
means that customers receiving many parcels take simultaneous delivery of 
letters. This has reduced the potential for selling delivery before 10am in Consumer preferences and last mile pricing  page 13 
 
 
respect of letters,  as this cannot be made available until Post Danmark‟s 
implementation of delivery before 10am in respect of parcels from 1 January 
2007. 
There are a number of preliminary conclusions, which can be drawn at 
this stage. Firstly, the market test has shown that customers react heavily 
against  having  to  pay  for  a  service  that  was  previously  provided  at  no 
charge. This is consistent with one of the results of the 2005 market study in 
Switzerland: the willingness to pay for established home delivery services, 
such as for food or beverages, is significantly higher than the willingness to 
pay for home delivery for letters or parcels. We think that this difference will 
get smaller over time, when customers get used to a new delivery business 
model. Moreover, in the Danish case, a number of customers understand that 
it is necessary to pay for a higher service level. In return, they also expect 
that more value is added to the service they now have to pay for.  
A second conclusion is that the subscription scheme essentially benefits 
recipients taking daily delivery of mail. Small business customers receiving 
mail  perhaps  only  three  to  four  days  a  week  are  reluctant  to  buying  a 
subscription for delivery before 10am six days a week.  However, a number 
of these customers are the opportunity to buy an alternative in the form of a 
post office box, which is a more affordable solution in terms of price. This 
emphasizes the importance of the discussion in Section 3 where it was stated 
that it is a crucial point for the mailing industry whether recipients have a 
low or high net utility of receiving (daily) mail. 
Thirdly,  we  observe  a  typical  free-rider  problem,  if  non-subscribing 
households  do  not  in  turn  receive  their  mail  significantly  later  than  the 
subscribers. Thus, the marginal utility of subscribing is clearly reduced. The 
resolution  this  problem  would  require  corresponding  measures  on  the 
operations side. 
Finally, it seems that delivery services, too, need to be segmented based 
on needs and willingness to pay. The market test also shows that the product 
of delivery before 10am is in excess of the needs of and too expensive for 
private recipients. It might therefore be a challenge to consider the relevance 
of launching a product to cater for the needs of certain categories of private 
recipients, such as housing associations with delivery boxes in the staircase. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
RPP has the potential to increase both economic welfare and operators‟ 
profits. RPP opens the door for a variety of last mile services. Such new 
services aim  at satisfying the  specific needs of the  receivers  and will be 
priced  closer  to  operating  costs.  Thus,  by  creating  effective  incentives, 
supply and demand are better aligned along the last mile. Consumer preferences and last mile pricing  page 14 
 
 
To  develop  the  RPP  as  set  out  in  Felisberto  et  al.  (2006)  further,  a 
discrete choice study was undertaken to reveal the willingness to pay of mail 
recipients  for  doorstep  delivery.  Building  on  these  results,  we  computed 
welfare and profit implications for various levels of a “delivery flat rate”, a 
fee that would be charged to receivers‟ in case they prefer doorstep delivery 
to a free P.O. box delivery. Finally, we presented first results from a RPP 
product sold in Denmark. 
We found one essential requirement for a successful implementation of 
RPP: Receivers need to bear a large implicit cost in case they choose not to 
be connected to the postal network. If for example mailers were no longer 
able  to  reach  recipients,  mail  demand  could  decline  significantly  with 
negative impacts on welfare and industry profits. As to whether or not this 
would actually be the case and how this could be prevented remains for 
further research.
14   
On the other hand, if postal organizations succeed to exploit the already 
significant willingness to pay for high -quality delivery services, they will 
generate a new source of financing the univers al service  and  reduce  its 
burden. Our market survey reveals that the current range of last mile services 
is rated highly  different among  recipients.  Our results indicate that large 
sections of the population receive services today to which they do not attach 
a high value. In the same time, there exists a significant fraction of receivers 
with a high willingness to pay , which could be enhanced by  adequately 
priced last mile services.  We have shown that although the introduction of 
the RPP is a politically controversial issue, it is a concept with considerable 
potential in postal delivery that offers the prospect of greater consumer 
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